How To Win War on Terror
by Donald Devine

How stands the war on terror? The White House produced a fine report “9/11: Five Years Later” a few months ago but it has been almost universally ignored. The left avoids it because anything George W. Bush says must be wrong and the right because whatever he does must be right. It deserves an objective review based upon the actual evidence presented.

Unlike most reviews of terrorism, this one gives the facts. Unfortunately, most administration apologetics so far has been rhetoric, which the polls prove is not working. President Bush did reference the evidence in the report in a speech at the FBI Academy last July but even there only one paragraph was devoted to facts on disrupting international terrorism and one on domestic successes. The majority of the speech was rhetoric and focused mostly on Iraq, where the unpopularity of the war drowned out the good news.

That is unfortunate because the report demonstrates great success in disrupting terrorism internationally:

  • In August 2006, British police arrested 24 people in London suspected in a plot to blow up as many as 10 planes bound for the United States, while Pakistani authorities made related arrests.
  • In June 2006, 17 suspects were arrested by Canadian authorities on suspicion of planning attacks on major targets in downtown Toronto using three tons of ammonium nitrate.
  • In June 2006, U.S. and Iraqi forces killed al-Qaida’s operational chief in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and killed or captured several of his top lieutenants, including his Baghdad chief of operations and his top bomb-maker.
  • In March 2006, the Jordanian General Intelligence Department disrupted planning by terrorists belonging to an al-Qaida cell to attack key civilian installations, including Jordan’s Queen Alia International Airport.
  • In December 2005, al-Qaida’s chief of external operations, Hamza Rabi’a, was killed, dealing another blow to al-Qaida’s leadership ranks.
  • In November 2005, Jemaah Islamiya bombing mastermind Dr. Azahari was killed during a raid by Indonesian police.
  • In May 2005, Pakistan apprehended the number three al-Qaida leader, Abu Faraj al Libi.
  • In January 2005, Germany arrested two suspected terrorists planning attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq.
  • In 2005, Lu’ay al-Saqa, al-Qaida member and one of Zarqawi’s chief lieutenants, was arrested in Turkey planning to attack cruise ships.
  • In 2004, British law enforcement arrested an al-Qaida operative who provided detailed reports on American targets to senior al-Qaida leaders and was suspected of planning attacks against innocent civilians in London.
  • Kuwaiti, Indonesian, Philippine, Algerian, and Chadian security forces, among others, many of which were trained by United States Government assistance programs, have countered terrorist threats within their borders through disruptions, captures, arrests, and prosecutions.
  • The Saudi security services have pursued, captured, or killed terrorists at a dramatic rate. Saudi Arabia has detained more than 600 operatives, fundraisers, and radical clerics in its fight against terrorism, and killed more than 100 terrorists.
  • We are increasing the size of our Special Operations Forces to support foreign internal defense, counterterrorist operations, and unconventional warfare. The overall budget for our Special Operations Forces has increased by 107 percent to support the War on Terror.

Notice that all of these successes--other than the final one--report on actual “output” evidence, not on simple “input” increases in budget or administrative effort. The point of a war is to control the enemy and this report gives specific evidence the efforts are succeeding. It is also important to note that all of the successes were accomplished by foreign governments and were only assisted indirectly or secondarily if at all by U.S. forces. The locals know the troublemakers and how to control them. We do not as Iraq makes clear but we can be smart enough to use those who do.

For better or worse, the public has determined Iraq is a loser. For better or worse, President Bush is determined to keep at it whatever the political results. His best argument is that if the U.S. does not face the terrorists in Iraq, they will attack here. But how can poor, scrawny, rag-tag and visible terrorists can make it across the ocean into the U.S. if there is any decent homeland security effort? The logic of the president’s argument is that terrorists cannot be prevented from entering the homeland.

Sadly, the logic seems supported by the facts. There are gaping holes in the anti-terrorism effort at the air and land borders and domestically. The White House report confirms this even if only by omission. The section on “securing borders and transportation” lists fourteen successes. But unlike those in the international accomplishment section not one is an output success describing deterred terrorists much less convictions. Undoubtedly some terrorists have been dissuaded by procedures. But all of the report examples of “success” are of spending more funds and instituting more procedures at the Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Treasury and so forth.

Focusing upon process rather than results ignores that each year DHS tests the air screening process at TSA and the screening system is almost always easily penetrated by sophisticated efforts. One homeland security expert told National Public Radio that professionals assume screening procedures can “only catch the fools.” Even 9/11 was an amateur operation and never would have succeeded if the U.S. national government in the guise of the Federal Aviation Administration did not have a policy at the time requiring cabin crews to cooperate with hijackers and had not ignored warnings that pilot cabins should have been secured with impenetrable doors.

What about success internally in the U.S.? The report section “disrupting terrorism domestically” reads in its entirety:

  • Since 9/11, significant convictions include Zacarias Moussaoui, for his role in helping al-Qaida carry out the 9/11 attacks, and the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for attempting to destroy American Airlines Flight 63. Other convictions include:
  • Hemant Lakhani, convicted in New Jersey and sentenced to 47 years in prison for attempting to sell an antiaircraft missile to a man he believed represented a terrorist group intent on shooting down a U.S. commercial airliner;
  • Lyman Faris, convicted in Virginia of providing material support to al-Qaida by surveying possible targets to attack in the United States, such as the Brooklyn Bridge, and reporting this information to al-Qaida;
  • Lynne Stewart, Mohammed Yousry, and Ahmed Abdel Sattar, convicted in New York on charges in connection with passing messages to the Islamic Group, a terrorist organization, from Sheik Abdel Rahman, the Group’s imprisoned leader;
  • Sheik Mohammed Ali Hasan al Moayad and Mohammed Moshen Yahya Zayed, convicted in Brooklyn of conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qaida and HAMAS;
  • Mohammed Junaid Babar, convicted in New York of providing material support to al-Qaida;
  • Five brothers, Ihsan, Hazim, Ghassan, Bayan and Basman Elashi, convicted in Dallas of conspiring to export proscribed computer equipment to state sponsors of terrorism;
  • Ahmad Omar Abu Ali, convicted in Washington, D.C., for providing material support to terrorist organizations in connection with the May 2005 bombings in Saudi Arabia;
  • Uzair Paracha, in New York, convicted of identity document fraud and violating regulations issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act by acting as a conduit for material support to al-Qaida;
  • Six U.S. citizens in Buffalo pled guilty to providing material support to al-Qaida and admitted to training in al-Qaida-run camps in Afghanistan; and
  • Six defendants in Portland, Oregon, pled guilty to charges relating to their attempt to travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban and al-Qaida against U.S. and allied troops.

Unlike at the borders, there are specific successes listed. What is most obvious, however, is that these mostly are the “fools.” The report itself identifies only two convictions it considers “significant” and even Moussaoui and Reid almost asked to be caught and, of course, the former was recognized too late to prevent 9/11. A few others mentioned were serious threats but most were amateur sympathizers who were easily entrapped by FBI agents, were publicly obvious in collecting information or only gave material support to others. None of these “others” were in the midst of a real terror operation. The most serious case—not yet settled--consisted of American ex-convicts converted to Islam in prison aiming to kill “infidels” by blowing up synagogues and incidentally military bases that was more domestic and  racial than Islamic. The more recent example of the six mostly Albanian American Muslims who were accused of plotting terrorism at Ft. Dix, New Jersey actually makes the point. Not only did they not have any firm plans but Dix is not a critical military target and they delivered a “jihadist video” to be developed by their local Circuit City, without which stupidity they would not have been apprehended! These guys were clowns, not terrorists.

The obvious conclusion why the U.S. has not had another 9/11 is that either the FBI cannot find the serious terrorists after five years—but then why have they not committed mayhem?—or, more likely, there are none to be found. Surely Al Qaeda itself is destroyed as an international logistics or even training operation. All it can do is produce videos and distribute them, mostly through public media, which could be harassed into being less cooperative. It only survives in remote mountains protected by the locals or where there is existing opposition and turmoil as in Iraq and Afghanistan. As FBI Director Robert Mueller told reporters recently, “We have seen an increase in the number of self-radicalized groups that…are nor organized by overseas groups.” Few of these have the means or will to carry out serious operations. Several of the plots taken to court actually were developed under the supervision of an undercover FBI agent and it is not clear they would have gone so far by themselves. There is no James Bond, 007-like evil Specter terrorist organization masterminding American terror operations.

The danger is not a central Al Qaeda but the idea embedded in its ideology that in turn appeals to many disaffected Muslims. These radical Muslims are a serious danger overseas, especially where Islam is the majority religion. They fit in and are often protected. These are determined and difficult to control. Yet, as the White House report proves, that is where efforts have had the greatest success. The foreign governments know their terrorists. Their very survival depends on controlling them. If we give them assistance and the tools, they can do the job. The only time this is not true is when we provide American targets for the terrorists in their backyard. That is the problem in Iraq and increasingly in Afghanistan. We should give these real terrorists decreasing opportunities to mount operations in such surroundings favorable to their limited resources.

The U.S. is doing many things right, especially cooperating with foreign governments to control their nuts. To do this we do not (or should not) ask how democratic they are only how efficient are their police (within some limits). Contrary to some on the right (and left), we need foreign friends even if their skirts are not so clean. Take Pakistan. Its autocratic President Pervez Musharraf recently removed the Supreme Court chief justice for questionable reasons and provoked a mass demonstration in the nation’s largest city increasing in intensity until gun battles erupted killing 40 and injuring at least 150, followed by a suicide bomb killing 25. Mortar fire exchanges took place between Pakistan and Afghan troops at the border. Musharraf is far from perfect but if we want to win the war on terror is it more effective to lecture him and the others on democracy or hope that they keep supporting us in the war on terror? A Musharraf replacement might be a modern George Washington but his electorate is more likely to support an Omar/Telaban-type, with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to the victor. To control the real terrorist threat, the first priority is winning foreign cooperation under the real-politique doctrine—again within some limits--that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Domestically, the pressure must be maintained on the fools because they can be dangerous. The FBI admits to a mere handful of Muslim undercover agents and only 40 who are proficient in Arabic, and none in Urdu and Pashto, so important for Pakistan and Afghanistan. They must develop more. A U.S. version of a counterespionage MI-5 not tied to a bureaucratic entity enmeshed in legalistic prosecutions like the FBI would help too but is unlikely politically until another major blunder. The good news is that the mass of Americans need not lose their liberties in the process since the real terror zealots come from a few nationalities and can be easily profiled even if it requires the hypocrisy of pretending not to do so. Winning the domestic war on terrorism only needs good police work—but it needs to be done more systematically yet selectively and more thoroughly, especially at the borders.

What we must not do is to be fooled that there is some enormous peril to U.S. survival that overwhelms every other American value. That is why Rudy Giuliani is leading for the Republican nomination—rampant fear. Since when did conservatives become so frightened over a threat that is so manageable with a bit of common sense? American good sense will prevail in the end but that could inadvertently lead to a President Hillary first (by Giuliani provoking a social conservative third party, for example). In the meantime, as President Bush said immediately after 9/11 if we let the terrorists change our ways, they will have won. The White House’s own report shows the means to defeat the terrorists and to preserve our freedoms at the same time by winning the real not the trivial terrorism wars.

Donald Devine, the editor of Conservative Battleline Online, was the director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management from 1981 to 1985 and is the director of the Federalist Leadership Center at Bellevue University.
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